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Introduction
James R. Hines, Jr.

In tax matters, as in so many oflife's matters, Europe and the United States display a
comfortable similarity that makes the residual differences provocative and interesting rather than discordant and disturbing. Since Europe and the United States face
many of the same tax problems, but resolve them independently, there is much to be
gained from understanding the reasons why European and American tax policies,
and tax jurisprudence, differ in the way that they do. Europe and the United States
approach fiscal federalism rather differently, particularly in recent years, and the
point of this book is to subject their approaches to careful comparative scrutiny.
The European Union and the United States are both federalist systems, and,
along with every other federalist system in the world today, both the European
Union and the United States face difficult choices over how best to divide authority
between centers and member states, and how exactly authority should be exercised.
Tax matters have been the loci of many of the federalist battles of recent decades. It
is understandable that taxation might provoke heated controversy, given the sheer
magnitude of tax responsibilities in modem times, and sharp regional differences of
opinion in tax matters. The European and American federations are both survivors
of past wars, and while it may be fairly said that tax policy itself is unrelenting
warfare, the goal of sensible legal design is to constrain the belligerents in ways
that lend these fights better tone and higher purpose than they might otherwise have.
The European Court of Justice and the US Supreme Court exert jurisdiction
over tax matters in their respective spheres, doing so on the basis of differing constitutional authorities, and in response to different economic and political realities.
Despite differences in their situations, the European Court of Justice and the US
Supreme Court struggle with many of the same issues and concerns. In both cases
the courts are called upon to resolve conflicts, real and imagined, between the tax
policies of member states, including conflicts that may arise when states compete
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to attract economic activities and the tax bases that accompany them. Both courts
bear the responsibility of preventing member states from imposing discriminatory
tax burdens, however construed, on residents of other member states. Both courts
need to strike appropriate balances between federal and state, and legislative and
judicial, responsibilities in tax matters, and both operate in environments in which
governments are chronically short of tax revenue.
One of the challenges in understanding comparative approaches to federalism
is the absence of anything resembling a consensus over the structure of an ideal
federalist system. It is clear that fiscal federalism, both in Europe and in the United
States, remains a work in progress, but the ultimate outlines of the fiscal structures
that these societies are building are hazy at best. Even in the absence of clear or
final guidance from citizens and legislators it is necessary for courts to resolve
contemporaneous tax disputes, and, in so doing, prod governments to clarify their
objectives and the way in which they are willing to distribute authority to pursue
those objectives. In time, we may settle on a shared understanding of how best to
structure intergovernmental fiscal relations in a federation. In the meantime, we
have to raise revenue in as fair and efficient a manner as possible, relying on the
courts to help us do so.
This volume brings together scholars from both sides of the Atlantic to consider
federalist tax jurisprudence as practiced in Europe and the United States. These
essays display a broad range of shared concerns, which is not to say that the scholars
agree on all points of substantive policy and interpretation. What can be said is that
there is general agreement that the exercise of comparing the tax jurisprudence of
the European Court of Justice and the US Supreme Court is likely to be informative
and beneficial to all concerned.
The first part of the volume consists of three papers addressing the tax decisions of the European Court of Justice. Chapter One, by Claudio Sacchetto, offers
an overview of areas of potential conflict between the tax claims of the European
Union, as enshrined in the European Community (EC) Treaty and interpreted by
the European Court of Justice, and domestic constitutional principles of member
states. The European Court of Justice implements its decisions based on interpretations of the EC Treaty's four fundamental freedoms (freedom of establishment, free
movement of workers, freedom to provide services, and free movement of capital
and payments), along with the Treaty's prohibition on State aid, which together
restrict the actions of member states. The chapter notes that this design for European taxation fits better with some domestic legal systems in Europe than it does
with others. Limiting the scope of state action in fiscal affairs is more consistent
with Anglo-Saxon systems that protect fundamental freedoms and rights from state
encroachment than it is with continental legal systems that delineate overarching
government fiscal responsibilities that can be pursued subject only to specified
restrictions. Since it is unlikely that European legal systems will converge any time
in the near future, the problem of reconciling these legal differences is one that will
face European tax jurisprudence in the years ahead.
Chapter Two, by Michael Lang, addresses issues related to double taxation.
The potential for double taxation arises whenever income is subject to more than
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one taxing jurisdiction, commonly because a taxpayer resident in one country earns
income in another. Since both source and residence countries have the ability, and
often the inclination, to tax the same income, it is clear that fair and efficient taxation
of international income requires the prevention, or at least the mitigation, of double
taxation. The practical difficulty facing the European Union is that its member
states relieve double taxation incompletely, doing so in quite different ways, and
to differing degrees. One class of issues that the European Court of Justice has had
to resolve, directly and indirectly in various of its rulings, concerns whether the
EC treaty obliges member states to relieve double taxation, or to adopt measures to
ensure that all income is taxed at least once. The chapter reports that the European
Court of Justice has not interpreted the EC treaty to require either the mitigation of
all double taxation or the taxation of all income, instead ruling in ways that attempt
to make national tax systems cohere in a fashion broadly consistent with the treaty.
In most of the world, international tax treaties play important roles in reducing
double taxation and thereby facilitating international commerce. From the standpoint of the European Union, the ability of European countries independently to
conclude treaties with each other, and with countries outside of Europe, raises the
possibility that the impact of these treaties will be to produce outcomes that are
detrimental (or beneficial!) to Europe as a whole and to the furtherance of the
freedoms represented in the EC treaty. The chapter offers a careful analysis of
the impact of treaty provisions on issues such as discrimination that are central
to several European Court of Justice decisions, and considers the criteria used by
the Court in resolving issues raised by treaties. The unsettled nature of the case
law and a number of the associated tax policy issues leaves this area very much
in flux, even as its importance increases due to the expansion of membership in
the European Union and the rate at which member countries conclude tax treaties
with non-European countries. The chapter concludes with the observation that the
European Court of Justice double taxation rulings have had the effect of limiting
the ability of member states to conduct their own tax affairs in ways that effectively
and efficiently collects tax revenue, suggesting that the likely outcome of such a
dynamic is the centralization of tax authority in Europe.
One of the most important features of multilateral tax agreements, and international tax treaties, is the application of the principle of nondiscrimination. Nondiscrimination provisions protect foreign investors from arbitrary and capricious taxation by governments to which they have little if any political recourse. Chapter
Three by Kees van Raad analyzes nondiscrimination as understood by the OECD
Model Treaty and the EC Treaty. As a general matter, the OECD Model Treaty takes
a considerably narrower view of the measures necessary to implement nondiscrimination than does the EC Treaty, at least as the EC Treaty is interpreted by the
European Court of Justice. The chapter examines these differences in the application of nondiscrimination, and offers a constructive proposal for ways to meld
the OECD and EC nondiscrimination provisions into something more coherent and
sensible than what either provides independently at present.
The second part of the volume, consisting of Chapter Four by Walter Hellerstein, surveys federalism aspects of the tax jurisprudence of the US Supreme Court.
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The US context is particularly noteworthy for its dearth of constitutional and legislative guidance in resolving issues related to fiscal federalism. Indeed, it is what
the US Constitution omits, rather than what it says, that is understood to be the
constitutional foundation of fiscal relations in the United States: the Commerce
Clause gives Congress the authority to regulate interstate commerce, its silence
on state authority taken to imply an absence of state authority. Chapter Four's
sweeping survey of the history of this 'dormant' Commerce Clause, its interpretation and implications, runs from the earliest days of the Republic to modern times.
This, together with the chapter's evaluation of the implications of the Constitution's
clauses guaranteeing privileges and immunities to citizens of every state, and rights
to due process, covers the foundation of federalist fiscal relations as practiced in
the United States. As the chapter notes, the US Supreme Court, acting with the
benefit of little Constitutional and legislative guidance, has had to find its own
way through the thicket of federalist issues, a challenge it has met doggedly, if not
always coherently.
The third part of the volume offers a comparison of tax decisions by the European Court of Justice and the US Supreme Court. Chapter Five, by Charles McLure,
evaluates the practice of tax assignment in Europe and the United States, calling
attention to the continuing impact of rules and practices adopted long ago in reaction to conditions at the time, but to which countries and courts still adhere. A
desire to integrate European society in the 1950s as a way of preventing future
conflicts, together with contemporaneous insistence on the part of national governments for the freedom to set tax policies to pursue independent national objectives,
produced a structure in which there is considerable European policy coordination,
but direct tax matters in the European Union require unanimous consent. The unanimity requirement impedes the type of tax policy coordination that the chapter
argues is necessary for sensible and coherent taxation in Europe, though recent
decisions by the European Court of Justice have been nudging policy in a direction
that may ultimately mandate more active coordination. The legislative structure of
the United States, adopted in an era in which federal tax collections on the modern
scale were simply unthinkable, offers state governments few guarantees that the
federal government will guard their fiscal interests. The tax policies of member
states of both the European Union and the United States have features that are
appropriate for independent jurisdictions, though perhaps less so for members of
a federation, reflecting that many of these policies have been in place since earlier
eras of less advanced economic integration.
Chapter Six by Tracy Kaye compares the application of nondiscrimination
rules, reporting significant differences between the paths taken by the European
Union and the United States. The chapter notes that the European Court of Justice
intervenes actively to protect taxpayers from discriminatory treatment by member
states, in the process, it argues, undermining the ability of European countries
to collect revenue with sensible tax policies. The US Supreme Court applies less
ambitious standards in preventing discrimination, thereby affording greater latitude
for state tax policies. In neither the European nor the American case can it be said
that there has emerged a fully coherent approach to fiscal federalism. The chapter
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concludes that, given the current realities, the public finances of Europe would be
strengthened by less active tax jurisprudence by the European Court of Justice,
whereas those of the United States would benefit from greater judicial oversight by
the Supreme Court.
Chapter Seven by Michael Graetz and Alvin Warren calls attention to one of the
great difficulties facing the European Court of Justice in its effort to apply the EC
Treaty's four freedoms to tax matters with international implications. The problem
facing the European Court of Justice is that economic freedoms can be construed
in multiple ways, and these interpretations carry differing tax policy implications.
Specifically, it is impossible, in the absence of harmonized national tax systems,
for all jurisdictions to provide equal tax treatment of income earned locally by
all investors, regardless of nationality, while simultaneously imposing equal tax
burdens on all income earned by residents, regardless of the locations in which
earned. Since the EC Treaty's freedoms can be interpreted as mandating both of
these neutral tax positions, their inconsistency virtually guarantees that an activist
European Court of Justice will find grounds to strike national tax provisions other
than those that are perfectly harmonized, rates and bases, with their neighbors.
Such sweeping application of nondiscrimination principles has not been embraced
by the US Supreme Court, which has reacted in part to the more limited approach
to residence-based taxation used by American states. How and when Europe will
find a stable solution to its tax policy problems may depend on future legislative
and political compromises.
The fourth part of the volume contains ambitious prognostications of future
tax developments in Europe and the United States. Chapter Eight by Michel Aujean
reviews recent nondiscrimination rulings by the European Court of Justice, noting
their impact in facilitating the international flow of economic resources in Europe,
but also noting the problems that these rulings have posed for national tax systems.
Extrapolating this trend, the chapter poses the question of how national governments
in Europe are likely to react to continued interference from the Court that largely
takes the form of finding for taxpayers in tax disputes. One possibility is that
such developments may drive European governments to forge cooperative, or even
Community-wide, agreements to harmonize, or systematize, their tax policies in
ways that preserve tax revenues while withstanding judicial scrutiny.
Chapter Nine, by Servaas van Thiel, analyzes two specific issues that arise
in applying nondiscrimination principles within the European Union. Given the
ability of European countries to conclude bilateral tax treaties with other members
of the European Union, it is possible that the terms of these treaties may afford
taxpayers from one European country more favorable terms than taxpayers from
another. Are such outcomes inconsistent with the principles embedded in the EC
Treaty, and if so, then how might the inconsistencies be resolved? The chapter
suggests that substantive differential treatment would, in principle, be inconsistent
with the Treaty, but notes that most tax treaty provisions are not affected by an MFN
obligation to the extent they allocate tax jurisdiction and avoid double taxation. The
second issue that the chapter considers is the extent to which the EC Treaty obliges
the European Court of Justice to require member governments to prevent double
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taxation of income earned within Europe by residents of the European Union.
The chapter notes that such an affirmative obligation is consistent with past Court
findings, and offers guidelines on how the responsibility to remove double taxation
might be assigned.
Chapter Ten, by Albert Radler, analyzes in some detail the D. case, noting the
willingness of the European Court of Justice, as evidenced by its holding, to permit
countries to achieve with tax treaties some outcomes that would not be permitted if
enacted by national laws. The chapter shares with its predecessor the forecast that
there will be continuing judicial action on issues related to most-favored nation
status within Europe, given the current potential for what many would view as
discriminatory outcomes resulting from bilateral tax treaties.
Chapter Eleven, by Ruth Mason, considers the future of tax treaties among
European countries and between European countries and the United States. The
important functions of these tax treaties, the chapter argues, are at grave risk from
future jurisprudence by the European Court of Justice. The Court has exhibited a
willingness to take an activist stance toward national tax laws within Europe, and,
since tax treaties are also under its jurisdiction, there is little to prevent the Court
from disallowing bilateral tax treaty provisions that it finds to be inconsistent with
the EC Treaty. In anticipation of such activism, the chapter notes that European
countries might take steps to standardize the application of tax treaty benefits to
all European nationals, or, more radically, conclude multilateral treaties within
Europe and between the European Union and the United States. While there are
clear obstacles to multilateralism on this scale, the chapter identifies benefits both
for Europe and the United States that might, in the hands of thoughtful policymakers,
make such multilateral tax agreements realistic possibilities.
The volume concludes with Chapter Twelve, by Reuven Avi-Yonah. This
chapter poses the question of what the US Supreme Court and the European Court of
Justice can learn from each other's jurisprudence. Following a thoughtful review
of recent experience, the chapter finds that there is much that these two august
institutions can learn from each other. As a general matter, the European Court
of Justice has dealt roughly with the tax rules of member states, routinely siding
with taxpayers who appeal their cases on the basis that national tax policies have
discriminatory impact or in other ways impede their freedoms. The US Supreme
Court, by contrast, has granted US states considerable discretion to pursue independent tax policies largely unimpeded by the imperatives of American federalism
or the claims of unhappy taxpayers. Neither court has found a perfect solution to
all of the challenges it faces, and perhaps both have gone too far, albeit in opposite
directions. The chapter suggests that something between the European and American approaches might make sense for both courts to adopt, and that this outcome is
made more likely by careful consideration of the lessons from across the Atlantic.

